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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery,
a felony of the first degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury on November
27, 19 73, before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins,
Judge.

Appellant was found guilty of robbery, a

felony of the second degree, and sentenced to serve
the indeterminant term of one to fifteen years
in the Utah State Prison.

This sentence was to

run concurrently
with another of five years to life
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which appellant was already serving.
Appellant then timely filed a motion for a
new trial.

However, said motion was never noticed

up for hearing before the court.

Two years later,

in 19 75, appellant filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.

A hearing was held on August 21,

19 75, before Honorable Stewart M. Hanson. At
that hearing, after the judge determined that
appellant had never had a hearing on his prior
motion for new trial, the judge made two observations:

1) the motion for a new trial was still

open and so the time for appeal had not run; and
2) the petition for the writ of habeas corpus was,
therefore, premature.

Because of the prematurity

of the writ the judge conducted an immediate
hearing on the motion for a new trial.
that motion on its merits.

He denied

He did not deny the

petition for the writ of habeas corpus on its
merits but, rather, dismissed it as being premature
(T-65, 66, Aug.21, 1975),

Appellant now appeals

from the denial of the motion for new trial and
from the dismissal of the petition for the writ
of habeas corpus.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the
lower court's action.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 2 -

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the first day of September, 1973, Mr,
Terry Adams was working alone at a service station
in Salt Lake City (T. 10). In the evening appellant
came to the service station with a box of toilet
articles which he wished to trade for a tank of
gas (T. 13). Mr. Adams knew appellant from the
Utah State Prison (T. 12), and he made the trade
(T. 13). The two men talked for a while and then
at closing time Mr. Adams opened a safe to deposit
the days earnings.

Appellant got behind Mr. Adams

and told him not to lock the safe.

Mr. Adams

looked around and saw that appellant was pointing
a pistol at him (T. 16). Mr. Adams tried to
dissuade appellant from committing robbery but
appellant said that he had to have the money
(T. 16). Mr. Adams testified that he began to be
afraid and that he didn't know if appellant would
shoot him or not.

Mr. Adams gave appellant the

money (T. 16). Appellant then forced Mr. Adams
into a restroom where he handcuffed him to the
plumbing of a sink (T. 17). Appellant left and
Mr. Adams began calling for help.
and called the police.

A passerby came

The police came and unlocked

the handcuffs (T. 18-19).
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Appellant was charged with aggravated
robbery, a felony of the first degree.

However,

at trial, defense counsel convinced the court to
change the charge to simple robbery, a felony of
the second degree (T. 34).
Appellant was found guilty by the jury*
Defense counsel prepared a motion for new trial
which he filed.

Defense counsel then prepared

the supporting affidavit.

Appellant, however,

refused to sign the affidavit and decided to get
other counsel to represent him (T. 8, Aug. 21, 1975).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONVICTION IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
Respondent agrees with appellant that it is
well established as a matter of law that a conviction must be affirmed if the evidence is sufficient
to support a finding that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Respondent respectfully

submits that appellant's conviction is adequately
supported by the evidence, every element of the
crime of robbery being conclusively established.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Before reexamining the evidence, it is
important to point out that a jury verdict must
stand unless it appears that the evidence is so
inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable
minds must have entered reasonable doubts that
the crime was committed.

State v. Sullivan, 6

Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957); State v. Danks,
19 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960).

In other

words there is a strong presumption in favor of
a jury verdict.

This is as it should be. The

jury is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses.

The jury can observe facial

expressions, mannerisms and tone of voice and thus
are in the best position to determine who is telling the truth.

For this and other reasons, evi-

dence must be viewed in a light most favorable to
the jury's verdict when it is reviewed on appeal.
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959).
See also State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357
P.2d 183 (1960), wherein the Court said:
"We reverse a jury verdict only
where we conclude from a consideration
of all the evidence, and the inferences
therefrom, viewed in the light most
favorable to such verdict, that the
findings are unreasonable." 11 Utah
2d at 214.
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In order to obtain a conviction, the state
had to prove that appellant unlawfully and
intentionally took property fom the immediate
presence of another, against his will, and that
such taking was accomplished by means of force
or fear.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1975).

The state called Mr. Terry Adams who testified
that appellant pulled a gun on him and demanded
money (T. 16). Mr. Adams said that he was
frightened and that he didn't know whether
appellant would shoot him or not, so he opened
the safe and gave appellant the money (T. 16).
Obviously this testimony establishes a prima facie
case of robbery.
The only real issue is the credibility of
two witnesses:

Mr. Adams, who testified of the

robbery, supra, Richard Albiston, who testified
for the defense.

Appellant's entire defense

centered around Richard Albiston.

Albiston testi-

fied that Mr. Adams had previously approached him
with a proposition to come and rob the service
station and that the two of them would split the
money (T. 36). Appellant attempted to create the
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inference that if Mr. Adams had offered Albiston
the chance to rob him, he probably robbed the
station himself and locked himself in the restroom.

The question for the jury was whether to

believe the direct testimony of Mr. Adams, or an
inference based on Albiston1s allegations.
The jury believed Mr. Adams, and for
good cause.

During rebuttal the state produced

prison records to prove conclusively that Albiston
was at the Utah State Prison at the time that he
alleges he met Mr. Adams and was offered the
chance to rob the station (T.. 53,54).

Albiston's

credibility was completely destroyed.
Appellant, however, further argues that
since Mr. Adams is a thrice convicted felon, his
testimony, without corroboration, is legally
inadmissible to support a guilty verdict under
the "reasonable doubt" standard.

Appellant however

offers no authority for this position, and respondent has been unable to locate any such rule of law.
Respondent submits that since the jury verdict is
adequately supported by evidence, there is no cause
for a new trial, nor is there grounds for a writ
of habeas corpus, especially in view of the wellestablished rule of law that sufficiency of evidence
is not justiciable in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Mathis
v. Colorado, 425 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970);
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and Application of Lewis, 339 P.2d 799, 800
(Okla. Crim. 1959).
Therefore, the decision of the lower court
should be affirmed.
POINT II
APPELLANT WAS EFFECTIVELY ASSISTED BY
COUNSEL.
In this jurisdiction, the standard for
competent counsel is enunciated in Jaramillo v.
Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d 343 (1970) wherein
the court said:
11

[an allegation of incompetent
counsel only arises when] . . .there
has been such a flagrant abuse of
legal procedure as to amount to bad
faith on the part of the lawyer."
24 Utah 2d at 22.
In Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241
(19 69), the court held that a defendant must show
that his defense amounted to a "sham or pretense"
before a case of ineffective assistance of counsel
can be considered.
Applying the rationale of the above quoted
cases to the facts of the instant case, it is clear
that appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.
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mess testimony regarding certain weapons seized at
an apartment in Salt Lake.

One of the state witnesses

was a Sheriff's deputy from Salt Lake County, John
Bernardo.

Officer Bernardo testified that he went

to 555 South Third East, in Salt Lake City, in
search of appellant.

He went to that address

because appellant's parole officer told Officer
Bernardo that that was appellant's address.

Officer

Bernardo then testified that he recovered some
weapons at that address (T. 26, 27). Defense
counsel did not object to this testimony. Appellant alleges that he should have, for the reason
that that is not his address and the testimony
is prejudicial.
Respondent contends that there could have
been a number of reasons why counsel would prefer
not to object to this testimony.

In the first

place, counsel was not even aware of the fact, if
it was a fact, that appellant was not residing at
that address.

Appellant turned to his counsel and

revealed this fact for the first time during closing
argument

(T.5, Aug. 21, 1975).

Another reason for

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not objecting would be to play down the fact that
weapons were found.

No testimony ever tied the

appellant to the weapons, whereas, an objection
might have strengthened inferences that the weapons
belonged to appellant.
In any case, the very most that is shown is
a possible error of judgment on the part of
defense counsel.

Several courts in neighboring

jurisdictions have held that:
"Mistakes or error of judgment
on the part of counsel and his client
do not establish the violation of
constitutional rights.1' Thomas v.
Rhay, 2 Wash. App. 843, 472 P.2d
6060 (1970).
See also:

Landers v. State, ex rel. Eyman, 7 Ariz.

App. 197, 437 P.2d 681 (1968); and People v.
Hartridge, 134 C.A.2d 659, 286 P.2d 72 (1955).
Neither is, an error of judgment the "sham or pretense" or "bad faith" necessary under Utah rule,
supra.
Appellant also claims incompetence by alleging that his counsel failed to properly prepare for
trial in that he failed to interview petitioner
before trial.

This allegation is absolutely false.

Appellant himself admits that his counsel discussed the case

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 10 -

with him prior to the preliminary hearing, that
counsel represented him at the preliminary hearing,
and that counsel telephoned him between the preliminary hearing and trial (T. 20,21, Aug* 21, 1975).
Furthermore, such a claim is incredible
considering the fact that counsel cross-examined all
witnesses,

examined a defense witness and had

the charge reduced from aggravated assault to simple
assault (T. 34)• There is certainly no evidence
of bad faith here.
Finally appellant claims ineffective
assistance of counsel by alleging that counsel
failed to present a timely appeal.

At the hearing

on August 21, 19 75, this question was brought before
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson.

Counsel testified

that after appellant's conviction he made a motion
for new trial which he filed.

He then drew up the

supporting affidavit and took it to the prison for
appellant to sign.

Appellant refused to sign and

indicated that he would get other representation
(T. 8, Aug. 21, 1975).
that he could do.

Obviously counsel did all

Appellant should not be allowed

to proceed to contend that he was inadequately
represented when his own actions were the cause
of his problem.

Appellant was fully informed as to
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the consequences of inaction (T. 8, Aug. 21, 1975).
The lower court ruling should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the motion for a
new trial was properly denied by the lower court.
Appellant failed to show sufficient grounds for a
new trial.

Appellant was lawfully convicted by

a jury of the crime of robbery notwithstanding the
able and effective assistance he received from
defense counsel.

His motion for a new trial being

properly denied, respondent submits that this Court
should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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